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ABSTRACT 
This note calls for an end to Major League Baseball’s statutory exemption from 
antitrust law for acts that are considered part of the “business of baseball.” The Curt 
Flood Act was a Congressional mistake, the product of years of faulty analysis and 
absurd holdings by the Supreme Court. This note will explain how the exemption 
came to fruition, outline the various problems with its inception, and conclude by 
proposing that Major League Baseball should be subject to antitrust law, just like all 
other professional sports leagues. 
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“Baseball is America’s pastime, but football is truly 
America’s passion.”1 
- Howie Long 
INTRODUCTION 
ajor League Baseball’s (MLB) statutory exemption to antitrust 
law under the Curt Flood Act—derived from case law, archaic 
societal viewpoints, and erroneous interpretation principles—should 
be repealed to place MLB under the same scrutiny as every other 
professional league. Take, for example, that on October 3, 2011, 
almost eleven million viewers tuned in to watch the Monday Night 
Football game on ESPN between the Indianapolis Colts and the Tampa 
Bay Buccaneers.2 That same night, the New York Yankees baseball 
team was playing against the Detroit Tigers in an American League 
Divisional Series playoff game.3 Only 6.05 million viewers watched 
the Yankees play the Tigers.4 This is one example of the disconnect 
between what Americans call their pastime and how we actually pass 
time. 
Major League Baseball, the dominant professional group for 
American baseball, enjoys a significant qualified immunity from 
antitrust law that, despite evidence undermining its reasoning, 5 
remains codified in a federal statute.6 This note will look at the case 
law, the social context, and the logic that gave rise to MLB’s 
exemption, and explain not only why it should be repealed, but also 
why none of the major sports should be exempt from antitrust law, 
save for very limited circumstances. 
This note will begin in Part I by addressing the purpose and impact 
of antitrust laws. Part II will briefly explain how antitrust law affects 
                                                 
1 Howie Long, Enshrinement Speech to the Pro Football Hall of Fame (June 29, 
2000), available at http://www.profootballhof.com/history/release.aspx?release
_id=751. 
2 Michael David Smith, Monday Night Football Easily Beats Baseball Playoff TV 
Ratings, PRO FOOTBALL TALK (Oct. 5, 2011, 1:54 PM), http://profootballtalk
.nbcsports.com/2011/10/05/monday-night-football-easily-beats-baseball-
playoffs-tv-ratings/. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 See infra Part V.A. 
6 See 15 U.S.C. § 26b (2006). 
M
2013 Grounding Into a Double Standard 305 
professional sports leagues. Part III will address the courts’ and 
Congress’ willingness to grant various exemptions from antitrust law 
to activities carried out by professional sports leagues. Part IV 
delineates the history of how Major League Baseball’s statutory 
exemption, known as the Curt Flood Act, came to fruition. Part V, the 
major focus of this note, will address the fallacies in reasoning behind 
both the major court decisions and Congress’ improper codification of 
these decisions. Finally, Part VI will offer that Major League Baseball 
should be subject to antitrust law, just like any other professional 
sports league is. 
I. ANTITRUST LAWS AND THEIR IMPACT ON HOW PROFESSIONAL 
SPORTS ARE CONDUCTED 
The gravity of antitrust laws, and the threat of a suit filed for any 
alleged violation, greatly affects how leagues and teams make business 
decisions regarding the league or players.7 But before looking at 
antitrust laws and their application to MLB in more detail, a baseline 
understanding of why antitrust laws exist is necessary. This primer 
will aid in comprehending how incongruous the MLB’s exemption to 
antitrust law is. 
Antitrust laws are grounded on the principle that, in an open, free 
market, there should never be an instance when competition among 
economic rivals inhibits trade.8 The goal is to protect the consumer 
from groups of individuals either coming together or acting in a 
                                                 
7 See, e.g., McCourt v. Cal. Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1194 nn.1,2 (6th Cir. 
1979) (discussing the reserve system once common to most major league sports 
under which players were not free to sign with another team, even after their 
contract expired, unless the new team paid an exaction to the original team). 
8 See Nw. Power Prods., Inc. v. Omark Indus., Inc., 576 F.2d 83, 89 (5th Cir. 
1978) (“[I]t is the elimination of the competition, by fair means or foul, that is 
the concern of the antitrust law . . . .”). For example, in considering the National 
Basketball League’s decision to reduce the playing season by five games, the 
Federal District Court in Chicago Professional Sports Limited Partnership v. 
National Basketball Association, 754 F. Supp. 1336, 1362 (N.D. Ill. 1991), aff’d, 
961 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1992), held that, “The record plainly establishes that the 
NBA’s 5-game reduction restrains trade and suppresses competition between the 
teams and the league and [TV networks]. The NBA has provided no evidence 
establishing that the reduction promotes competition, or will, between NBA 
basketball games or NBA games and other television programming of any 
kind.” 
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monopolistic capacity to restrain trade.9 The Sherman Act10 was 
enacted in 1890 with these goals in mind.11 
In any antitrust suit, a plaintiff must initially show that the alleged 
conduct affects interstate commerce in some form.12 If the plaintiff can 
prove that the alleged restraint affects interstate commerce, the 
plaintiff must then satisfy three main requirements: (1) a collusive 
effort by two or more economic rivals, or “duality”; (2) an 
unreasonable restraint on trade; and (3) damages.13 
With the goals of antitrust laws in mind, it is easy to see how the 
threat of enforcement might affect business decisions.14 If a company 
is aware that its actions may violate antitrust laws, the company will 
likely choose a different course of action.15 Thus, the looming threat 
                                                 
9 Monopolies are governed by 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). They will not be the focus of 
this note. 
10 Act of July 2, 1890, Pub. L. No. 51-647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006) (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or 
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several 
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”)). 
11 See, e.g., Nelson O. Fitts, Note, A Critique of Noncommercial Justifications for 
Sherman Act Violations, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 478, 483–84 (1999). 
12 Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 66 (1911) (“There must be 
some direct and immediate effect upon interstate commerce in order to come 
within the act.”); United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 461 (1920) 
(Day, J., dissenting) (“[I]t was the purpose of the Sherman Act to condemn, 
including all combinations and conspiracies to restrain the free and natural flow 
of trade in the channels of interstate commerce.”). See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents 
of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 88 n.1 (1984). 
13 See Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. at 99–127. 
14 “The goal of the antitrust laws is to protect economic freedom and opportunity 
by promoting free and fair competition in the marketplace. Competition in a free 
market benefits American consumers through lower prices, better quality and 
greater choice. Competition provides businesses the opportunity to compete on 
price and quality, in an open market and on a level playing field, unhampered by 
anticompetitive restraints. Competition also tests and hardens American 
companies at home, the better to succeed abroad.” Antitrust Division Mission, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/atr/about/mission.html (last 
visited Dec. 3, 2012). 
15 This may be especially true given that a company’s officers, directors, and 
agents can be held personally responsible for knowing violations. See United 
States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 416 (1962) (“Based upon the foregoing, we hold 
that a corporate officer is subject to prosecution under s 1 of the Sherman Act 
whenever he knowingly participates in effecting the illegal contract, 
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imposed by antitrust laws protects consumers by curbing collusive 
conduct and maintaining an open market.16 The next section will 
examine how antitrust law affects the decisions of professional sports 
entities, and how a challenge to league activity might be raised. 
II. ANTITRUST LAW AND CHALLENGES IN SPORTS 
This section will show the relationship between the different 
parties in professional sports and the kinds of activities that might give 
rise to a viable antitrust claim. Knowing the kinds of activities that 
may raise an antitrust claim is important in order to understand the 
kind of normally illegal activities from which Major League Baseball 
is immune. This section will first address the connections between the 
parties involved in the production of professional sports. It will then 
discuss the steps needed to sue for antitrust violations in the world of 
sports. 
The parties involved in the production of professional sports can be 
classified into three different groups: the players, the teams, and the 
league.17 The players are legally connected to their team or club 
through the standard player contract.18 The players are legally involved 
with the league through the collective bargaining agreement.19 Finally, 
the team is connected to the league through the bylaws that each team 
                                                                                                                   
combination, or conspiracy-be he one who authorizes, orders, or helps perpetrate 
the crime-regardless of whether he is acting in a representative capacity.”). 
16 See generally Robert H. Lande, Proving the Obvious: The Antitrust Laws Were 
Passed to Protect Consumers (Not Just to Increase Efficiency), 50 HASTINGS 
L.J. 959 (1999) (discussing the purpose of antitrust law from an economic 
perspective). 
17 See Stephen F. Ross, Monopoly Sports Leagues, 73 MINN. L. REV. 643, 647 
(1989). 
18 See generally WALTER T. CHAMPION JR., FUNDAMENTALS OF SPORTS LAW 
§ 16:3. For examples of common terms contained in standard player contracts 
which have been the subject of antitrust cases, see Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 
259 n.1, and Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 610 n.5 (8th Cir. 
1976). 
19 Collective bargaining agreements are not the subject of this note and are only 
used anecdotally to provide a complete picture of MLB and its relationship with 
antitrust law. 
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votes on which to adopt.20 The bylaws govern the rules and laws to 
which each team must conform.21 
In many sports situations, members, teams, or players challenge 
actions taken by the league under 15 U.S.C. § 1.22 Potential § 1 
violations occur when economic rivals come together to inhibit 
competition within interstate commerce.23 When an antitrust case is 
filed, sports leagues such as MLB or the National Football League 
(NFL) often move to dismiss the suit with the affirmative defense that 
they are acting as a ‘single entity’ regarding the conduct at issue.24 
Because § 1 challenges are premised on economic rivals coming 
together in a collusive effort, there can be no collusive acts if the court 
determines that the groups involved are not independent, distinct 
identities.25 Courts have frequently found that leagues do not act as a 
single entity, but rather as groups of individual organizations.26 
                                                 
20 Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposal for the Antitrust Regulation of Professional 
Sports, 79 B.U. L. REV. 889, 907 (1999) (“The bylaws of the professional sports 
leagues have been designed to make expansion difficult, thus restricting the 
output of professional sports franchises. Indeed, the bylaws of Major League 
Baseball, the NFL, the NBA, and the NHL do not provide any objective 
standards for membership at all. They simply require a three-fourths vote of all 
of the owners for the admission of new teams.”). 
21 See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 610 (“The League performs various administrative 
functions, including organizing and scheduling games, and promulgating rules. 
A constitution and bylaws govern its activities and those of its members.”). 
22 See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
23 Standard Oil of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60–71 (1911) (surveying 
historical applications of antitrust laws and § 1). 
24 See Fed. Baseball Club of Balt. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Base Ball Clubs, 259 
U.S. 200 (1922); Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953); Radovich 
v. Nat’l Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 
(1972); Am. Needle v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010); Piazza v. 
Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993). 
25 See Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2212 (“The key is whether the alleged contract, 
combination, or conspiracy is concerted action—that is, whether it joins together 
separate decisionmakers. The relevant inquiry, therefore, is whether there is a 
contract, combination or conspiracy amongst separate economic actors pursuing 
separate economic interests such that the agreement deprives the marketplace of 
independent centers of decisionmaking and therefore of diversity of 
entrepreneurial interests.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)). See also 
Nathaniel Grow, American Needle and the Future of the Single Entity Defense 
Under Section One of the Sherman Act, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 449, 449 (2011) (“The 
Sherman Antitrust Act is structured around a fundamental distinction between 
concerted and independent action. . . . [T]he independent actions of a single firm 
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Since a professional sports league is a combination of teams 
coming together to exhibit professional sporting events, some acts that 
would normally violate antitrust law are allowed.27 Even though 
restrictive actions are carried about by a group of teams, who are 
economic rivals,28 certain conduct will not be in violation of § 1. As 
one well-cited author explained: 
[I]n the final analysis, the unitary nature of the NFL’s product 
should weigh heavily in favor of finding single-entity status. The 
NFL attempts to make NFL football as popular as possible so that 
it can compete effectively against other forms of entertainment for 
network television revenues. The internal restraints and agreements 
made by the League are designed to promote efficiencies in 
attaining this end. They are only ancillary to the main purpose of 
producing a more marketable product. Viewed in this manner, 
these restraints should not be subject to successful challenge under 
the Sherman Act.29 
Thus, while normally a § 1 claim would be appropriate to 
challenge concerted conduct, the restraint will be allowed if it is 
reasonable to further the purpose and goal of the league, and the 
purpose is legitimately pro-competition. 
Normally, if a plaintiff can satisfy every element to a claim, 
including damages, a lawsuit would be viable. However, as the next 
section notes, both the courts and Congress have granted various 
exemptions to antitrust law in the sports realm. 
                                                                                                                   
are addressed by the Sherman Act’s much narrower Section Two, which only 
regulates the monopolization, or attempted monopolization, of an industry.”). 
26 See infra Part V.C. 
27 NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 98–105 (1984). 
28 As the Supreme Court ultimately held in Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2212 (“The 
NFL teams do not possess either the unitary decisionmaking quality or the single 
aggregation of economic power characteristic of independent action. Each of the 
teams is a substantial, independently owned, and independently managed 
business. ‘[T]heir general corporate actions are guided or determined’ by 
“separate corporate consciousnesses,’ and ‘[t]heir objectives are’ not 
‘common.’”). 
29 Myron C. Grauer, Recognition of the National Football League as A Single 
Entity Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act: Implications of the Consumer 
Welfare Model, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1, 33 (1983). 
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III. EXEMPTIONS IN SPORTS 
In an attempt to help professional leagues function smoothly, the 
courts and Congress have granted various exemptions that apply to all 
sports.30 Although it would be logical to assume that antitrust 
principles apply to all aspects of professional sports, this assumption is 
faulty.31 Sports contain a combination of many different legal fields.32 
Thus, a blind application of antitrust law would be inapposite to a 
holistic and comprehensive view of justice. 
Congress has passed acts that specifically allow leagues to engage 
in activities that would normally be considered anticompetitive and, 
thus, make the league liable under antitrust law.33 Congress also has 
passed legislation relating to the unionization of labor groups, which 
allows the players associations to bargain and agree on behalf of the 
associations’ individual members.34 
However, the U.S. Supreme Court also has allowed for exemptions 
from antitrust law through non-statutory exemptions.35 The most 
notable is the labor exemption, which allows for immunity from 
antitrust law if the conduct in question contemplates a mandatory 
subject matter of a typical collective bargaining agreement (CBA), in 
that the subject was negotiated at arm’s length and in good faith 
                                                 
30 Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 623 (8th Cir. 1976) (discussing 
the nonstatutory labor exemption). 
31 LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, 1 CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMP. TR. & 
MONO. § 4:16 (4th ed.) 
32 Labor law dictates the relationship between the player and league, and what falls 
under the collective bargaining agreements. Any broadcasting rights are subject 
to the standards of the Federal Communications Commission. The teams’ logos 
and symbols have intellectual property implications. See Matthew J. Mitten & 
Hayden Opie, “Sports Law”: Implications for the Development of International, 
Comparative, and National Law and Global Dispute Resolution, 85 TUL. L. 
REV. 269, 271 (2010). 
33 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006) (granting immunity from antitrust liability for 
acts associated with broadcasting rights and the merger of the NFL and 
American Football League). 
34 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2006). 
35 See Fed. Baseball Club of Balt. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Base Ball Clubs, 259 
U.S. 200 (1922). 
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between the parties.36 If these three requirements are met, then the 
issue or conduct is one to be decided by labor law, and not antitrust.37 
This labor exemption has an elucidatory effect. When dealing with 
groups of individuals who unionize, the courts want the parties to 
negotiate between themselves.38 These negotiations are then 
memorialized into a CBA. The CBA has the threefold purpose of 
protecting every party’s interest, redistributing wealth, and helping to 
ensure the future economic growth of the league.39 Thus, courts are 
hesitant to interject their opinions and rulings into matters that are very 
complex, and typically the result of months or years of negotiation.40 
The importance of these exemptions is that they illustrate how 
certain league conduct can be immune from antitrust suits, aside from 
arguing the merits and regardless of its meritorious or detrimental 
effects or character.41 This recognition becomes critical as we now 
shift our focus into Major League Baseball’s exemption. 
IV. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL’S EXEMPTION 
In 1998, Congress passed the Curt Flood Act, which codified a 
longstanding tradition of case law that held baseball exempt from 
antitrust liability. 42 This section will explain how Major League 
Baseball became exempt through social bias and faulty interpretive 
methods. The section starts by discussing the historical cases that led 
to the legal decision that created the non-codified exemption, Flood v. 
Kuhn.43 After discussing Flood and its progeny, this section will 
conclude by examining how Congress passed the Curt Flood Act, 
codifying an incorrect line of reasoning into law. 
                                                 
36 Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 623 (8th Cir. 1976). 
37 Id. at 611 (“The statutory exemption was created to insulate legitimate collective 
activity by employees, which is inherently anticompetitive but is favored by 
federal labor policy, from the proscriptions of the antitrust laws.” (citing Apex 
Hoisery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940))). 
38 Id. at 611–12. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 619. 
41 Id. 
42 Curt Flood Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105–297, § 3, 112 Stat 2824 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 26b (2012)). 
43 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972). 
312 UMass Law Review v. 8 | 302 
A. Case History Pre-Flood  
The foundations for Major League Baseball’s antitrust exemption 
began in 1922 with the case of Federal Baseball v. National League of 
Professional Base Ball Clubs.44 Federal Baseball was a challenge to 
the National and American League merger.45 The plaintiffs charged 
that the defendants came together as separate leagues to monopolize 
the business of baseball by the use of the reserve clause.46 
The reserve clause gave teams the right to exercise an option to re-
sign a player in perpetuity.47 The club could exercise the option and 
have the player re-sign with the team, or the club could assign the 
option to another team.48 If the player did not want to re-sign with the 
team, despite the team’s wishes, the player would not be allowed to 
play in the league in the next season.49 As a result, clubs participating 
in the Federal Baseball League were unable to obtain players who had 
contracts with the National and American League.50 
The Supreme Court, led by Justice Holmes, held that baseball was 
not engaged in interstate commerce.51 The failure to satisfy this 
threshold question bars relief for the claimant, irrespective of the 
merits of the case. The Court’s justification was based on the principle 
that Major League Baseball was not primarily engaged in interstate 
commerce because teams merely exhibited baseball games.52 The 
                                                 
44 Fed. Baseball Club of Balt. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Base Ball Clubs, 259 U.S. 
200 (1922). 
45 Id. at 207. 
46 Id. 
47 Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420, 434 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (“The 
reserve clause bound a player to either enter a new contract with the same team 
in the succeeding year of the player’s contract or be considered ineligible by the 
National and American Leagues to serve any baseball club.”). 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Fed. Baseball Club of Balt. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Base Ball Clubs, 259 U.S. 
200, 208 (1922). (“The business is giving exhibitions of base ball, which are 
purely state affairs.”). 
52 Id. (“But the fact that in order to give the exhibitions the Leagues must induce 
free persons to cross state lines and must arrange and pay for their doing so is 
not enough to change the character of the business. . . . As it is put by defendant, 
personal effort, not related to production, is not a subject of commerce. That 
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Federal Baseball holding that baseball is a game laid the groundwork 
for later courts to hold that the commercial benefits that baseball 
received as a result of the exhibition of their games were ancillary. 
This key factor is foundational in understanding why MLB is 
exempt from antitrust laws. This initial case prevented baseball from 
being considered a business. It was not until 1953 in the case of 
Toolson v. New York Yankees that the Supreme Court spoke again 
regarding Major League Baseball.53 Player George Earl Toolson was 
traded from the Newark International Baseball Club to the 
Binghampton Exhibition Company, Inc.54 When Toolson refused to 
report to Binghampton, he was placed on the “ineligible list” and thus 
was no longer allowed to play professional baseball.55 When Toolson 
learned of his banishment, he sued, arguing that the New York 
Yankees, among others, were individual entities engaged in collusive 
activity that unfairly restrained trade.56 
Although practical logic in 1953 should have dictated the 
conclusion that MLB was engaged in interstate commerce and subject 
to antitrust suits, the Court refused to overrule Federal Baseball.57 
With the 1950s being the “heyday” of MLB, featuring players such as 
Mickey Mantle, Yogi Berra, and Bobby Thompson,58 the Court listed 
four reasons why it would not overturn Federal Baseball.59 
First, thirty years had passed since the Federal Baseball decision, 
and Congress did not pass any legislation that placed the “business” of 
baseball within the purview of antitrust law.60 Second, in those thirty 
years, the business of baseball had developed while basing its 
decisions on the understanding that it would not be subject to antitrust 
                                                                                                                   
which in its consummation is not commerce does not become commerce among 
the States because the transportation that we have mentioned takes place.”). 
53 Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953). 
54 Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 93, 93 (S.D. Cal. 1951), aff’d, 200 
F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. granted 345 U.S. 963, aff’d 346 U.S. 356 (1953). 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 93–94. 
57 Toolson, 346 U.S at 357. 
58 Baseball’s Best: 1950’s, MLB.COM, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/baseballs_best/mlb
_bb_library50.jsp (last updated June 6, 2011). Thompson is best known for his 
“Shot Heard ‘Round the World’” in the 1951 National League Playoff. Id. 
59 Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953). 
60 Id. 
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laws.61 Third, the Court was not in a position to “overrule the prior 
decision and, with retrospective effect, hold the legislation 
applicable.”62 Finally, the Court stated that if antitrust laws should 
apply to baseball, the steps to enforce antitrust should start with the 
legislature.63 
B. The Seminal Case of Flood v. Kuhn 
After these cases, no major controversy arose until 1969 when Curt 
Flood—an all-star caliber center fielder for the St. Louis Cardinals,64 
historically one of the best teams in Major League Baseball65—was 
traded to the Philadelphia Phillies.66 Flood challenged the trade, and 
asked the Commissioner of Baseball to reconsider the trade and allow 
him to become a free agent.67 When the Commissioner refused, Flood 
instituted suit challenging professional baseball’s reserve clause.68 
Justice Blackmun delivered the majority opinion for the Court.69 
After discussing the Federal Baseball and Toolson cases, Blackmun 
discussed the relevant cases since Toolson.70 Blackmun’s critical 
analysis was the case of United States v. Shubert,71 wherein the 
Defendant tried to rely on the holding from Federal Baseball to argue 
that the business of exhibiting vaudeville shows did not amount to 
                                                 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. (“We think that if there are evils in this field which now warrant application 
to it of the antitrust laws it should be by legislation.”). 
64 407 U.S. 258, 264 (1972). 
65 The Cardinals are the second-most successful team in terms of World Series 
wins in the MLB with eleven World Series Championships, rivaled only by the 
New York Yankee’s twenty-seven World Series Championships. See Pete 
Palmer & Gary Gillette, St. Louis Cardinals: Team History & Encyclopedia, 
BASEBALL-REFERENCE.COM, http://www.baseball-reference.com/teams/STL/ 
(last updated Oct. 19, 2012). 
66 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 265 (1972). 
67 Id. at 265. 
68 Id. at 258, 265. 
69 Id. at 259. 
70 Id. at 274-282. 
71 348 U.S. 222 (1955). 
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interstate commerce.72 Justice Blackmun noted that in Toolson Chief 
Justice Warren expressly limited the holding to baseball.73 
Justice Blackmun noted other cases of professional sports leagues 
held to be within the purview of antitrust laws.74 Further, Blackmun 
noted the extensive amount of legislative proposals to expand the 
exemption which were introduced after Toolson, but which failed to 
pass both houses.75 Justice Blackmun explicitly declared that “[I]t 
seems appropriate to now say that . . . Professional baseball is a 
business and it is engaged in interstate commerce.”76 Ultimately, 
however, the majority in Flood did affirm MLB’s exemptions, and 
thus held MLB’s reserve clause exempt from antitrust lawsuits.77 
C. The Downfall of Flood 
The 1993 case Piazza v. Major League Baseball critically analyzed 
the Court’s decision in Flood and limited MLB’s exemption to the 
reserve clause.78 Although Piazza was not a challenge to the reserve 
clause,79 Major League Baseball attempted to invoke its immunity 
from an antitrust suit based on the Flood decision.80 Judge Pavoda 
opined that the Supreme Court in Flood undercut the reasoning of 
Federal Baseball by holding that MLB was engaged in interstate 
commerce, and he concluded that the “Flood Court viewed the 
disposition in Federal Baseball and Toolson as being limited to the 
reserve system, for baseball developed between 1922 and 1953 with 
the understanding that its reserve system, not the game generally, was 
exempt from the antitrust laws.”81 Thus, he held that “the antitrust 
exemption created by Federal Baseball is limited to baseball’s reserve 
                                                 
72 Shubert, 348 U.S. at 226. 
73 Flood, 407 U.S. at 275–77. 
74 Id. at 276–82 (discussing United States v. Int’l Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 
(1955) (boxing); Radovich v. Nat’l Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957) 
(football); Haywood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971) 
(basketball). 
75 Id. at 281 n.17. 
76 Id. at 282. 
77 Id. 
78 831 F. Supp. 420, 435 (E.D. Pa. 1993). 
79 Id. at 423. 
80 Id. at 435. 
81 Id. at 436. 
316 UMass Law Review v. 8 | 302 
system, and because the parties agree that the reserve system is not at 
issue in this case, I reject Baseball’s argument that it is exempt from 
antitrust liability in this case.”82 
Although the case has limited precedential value, Piazza is 
indicative of how interpretations of Federal Baseball, Toolson, and 
Flood have evolved, signaling what may be the beginning of the end to 
the MLB’s broad exemption.83 After seventy years, courts seem 
willing to correct this past mistake. In Piazza, the “business of 
baseball” was subject to the same antitrust scrutiny as any other sports 
league.84 
D. Contrary Congressional Action 
After years of “punting” by the Supreme Court and the more recent 
contrary case law like Piazza, Congress finally acted. In 1998 an act 
was passed to codify MLB’s antitrust exemption into federal law.85 
The Act, entitled the Curt Flood Act (which may be viewed as a slap 
in the former all-star’s face by an occult hand), grants MLB an 
excessively broad exemption with but a few exceptions to the business 
of baseball, not just the reserve clause.86 Despite the small number of 
exceptions to the exemption, most issues arising out of conduct that 
concerns the “business of baseball” will be exempt from antitrust 
lawsuits under the Act.87 
This “intentional walk” for baseball was an unfortunate 
consequence of weighing societal value and poor judicial decisions, 
                                                 
82 Id. at 438. Judge Pavoda added that cases from other jurisdictions applying the 
exemption beyond on the reserve clause were not binding on his court and he 
would not follow them, that exemptions to antitrust are to be narrowly 
construed, and that “the exemption at issue has been characterized by its own 
creator as an ‘anomaly’ and an ‘aberration.’” Id. at 439 (citing Flood, 407 U.S. 
at 286 (Douglas, J. dissenting) (“Federal Baseball is a ‘derelict in the stream of 
the law.’”)). 
83 Compare Fed. Baseball Club of Balt. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Base Ball Clubs, 
259 U.S. 200 (1922), and Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953), 
and Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972), with Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 
832 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993). 
84 Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 436. 
85 Curt Flood Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105–297, § 3, 112 Stat 2824 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 26b (2006)). 
86 Id. Labor issues, umpires, and minor league players are a few of the things 
outside of the scope of the act. See 15 U.S.C. § 26b(1)–(6) (2006). 
87 Id. § 26b. 
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while undervaluing more recent, appropriate case law, and should be 
reversed. The next section will explain the problematic reasoning 
behind the decisions above and examine contradictory case law that 
carelessly was dismissed. 
V. THE “INTENTIONAL WALK” 
This section will show that the Curt Flood Act is unacceptable 
because of the unique social influence that led to its passage, the 
troubling interpretive methods employed by the Supreme Court, and 
the disregard of contrary case law. This section will begin with an 
analysis of the historical social view of baseball, and how that shaped 
the holdings in Federal Baseball, Toolson, and Flood that ultimately 
led to the passage of the Curt Flood Act. Next, the reliance on 
congressional silence by the Court in Toolson will be deconstructed 
and analyzed. Then, the baseball-related decisions between Federal 
Baseball and Piazza will be used to demonstrate that the Act should 
never have been passed if stare decisis was a factor that drove 
Congress to pass the Act. This section will close by noting other 
professional sports league antitrust cases that demonstrate that the 
legal rationale for continued enforcement of the Act is illogical. 
A. The Societal Impact of Baseball From 1922–1998 
Baseball has an incredibly important place in our nation’s history 
as a sport and as a cultural institution.88 Professional baseball games 
date back to the mid-19th century.89 The games and players have 
meant more to America than just nine innings with a stretch in the 
seventh. In 1947, Jackie Robinson became the first African American 
player to play in the MLB,90 sixteen years before Martin Luther King, 
Jr.’s “I Have a Dream” speech.91 Baseball has produced players who 
have illnesses and surgeries named after them.92 Baseball has seen this 
                                                 
88 See History of the Game: Doubleday to Present Day, MLB.COM, http://mlb.mlb
.com/mlb/history/ (last updated June 6, 2011). 
89 Id. 
90 Biography, JACKIEROBINSON.COM, http://www.jackierobinson.com/about/bio
.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2012). 
91 Martin Luther King, I Have a Dream Speech (Aug. 28, 1963), available at 
http://www.mlkonline.net/dream.html. 
92 See Lou Gehrig’s Disease: Biography of Lou Gehrig, LOUGHERIG.COM, http:
//www.lougehrig.com/about/bio4.htm (last visited Dec. 3, 2012); Tommy John 
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country through two World Wars, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, 
the Cold War, and the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.93 
However, the history and tradition of baseball is exactly that. The 
game is still played today on a national level, but with the times, the 
importance of the game has changed.94 The era when baseball was at 
its biggest was the glory days of newspapers and back-page box 
scores.95 Yet, with the arrival of the 1960s, when radio broadcasts 
were booming and televisions were becoming fixtures in American 
households, professional baseball started to see its decline.96 From 
1961 to 1962, baseball and football switched positions as America’s 
favorite sport in the opinion of American sports fans, going from a 
once even split of 24% and 24% to 21% and 32%, respectively.97 The 
gap never really closed again, and in December of 2011, 36% of those 
surveyed said that professional football was their favorite sport, while 
only 13% preferred baseball—a tie with those who preferred college 
football.98 
Unfortunately, when the Supreme Court heard Federal Baseball in 
1922, the Justices were likely just as enamored with baseball as the 
rest of the nation.99 Society then might have been the roaring 1920s, 
but a staple in the American diet was talking about your baseball team 
after checking the box score on the back page of the daily newspaper. 
It was the only real game in town.100 Though the NFL did have its 
                                                                                                                   
Surgery, ESPN.COM, http://espn.go.com/mlb/topics/_/page/tommy-john-surgery 
(last updated Dec. 5, 2012). 
93 See History of the Game: Doubleday to Present Day, supra note 88. 
94 See Smith, supra note 2. 
95 See History of the Game: Doubleday to Present Day, supra note 88. 
96 Joseph Carroll, Football Reaches Historic Popularity Levels in Gallup Poll, 
GALLUP.COM (Jan. 19, 2007), http://www.gallup.com/poll/26188/football-
reaches-historic-popularity-levels-gallup-poll.aspx. 
97 Id. See also Regina A. Corso, Football is America’s New Favorite Sport as Lead 
Over Baseball Continues to Grow, HARRIS.COM (Jan. 25, 2012), http://www
.harrisinteractive.com/NewsRoom/HarrisPolls/tabid/447/mid/1508/articleId/950
/ctl/ReadCustom%20Default/Default.aspx. 
98 Id. 
99 For example, there is evidence that Justice Holmes’ father was a baseball fan. 
See Thomas V. Silvia, Baseball as a Source of Judicial Thought and 
Construction, 78 MICH. B.J. 1296, 1298 n.12 (1999). 
100 See History of the Game: Doubleday to Present Day, supra note 88. 
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inaugural season in 1922,101 the first modern day Super Bowl was not 
until 1967.102 At the time of the Federal Baseball decision, 
professional-level, organized baseball had sixteen teams from Boston 
to St. Louis103 and had enamored Americans with nineteen years of 
World Series.104 Organized professional baseball had been around 
since the National League was formed in 1876,105 when the eldest of 
the sitting Justices in Federal Baseball was thirty-five years old, and 
the youngest was just fourteen.106 Having established its reputation as 
“America’s Game,” baseball was likely idolized equally by the 
Supreme Court and the common man, bestowing a profound and 
personal impact on both. 
The crux of the argument in Federal Baseball was that MLB was 
acting as a monopoly and excluding teams from joining that were in 
the Federal Baseball League.107 America was fresh out of fighting the 
First World War in 1919, and a decision against baseball would not 
have been viewed well, as Americans were trying to regain a sense of 
normalcy.108 Consider the powerful effects of the Standard Oil 
decision in 1911, which ultimately destroyed John Rockefeller’s oil 
empire.109 Perhaps the Justices did not want a similar destruction of 
                                                 
101 American Heroes, FOOTBALL HISTORIAN, http://www.footballhistorian.com/
football_heroes.cfm?page=30 (last visited Dec. 3, 2012). 
102 History, NFL.COM, http://static.nfl.com/static/content/public/image/history/pdfs/
History/Super_Bowl_Sums_2011.pdf (last visited Dec. 3, 2012). 
103 Pete Palmer & Gary Gillette, 1922 Major League Baseball Team Statistics and 
Standings, BASEBALL-REFERENCE.COM, http://www.baseball-reference.com
/leagues/MLB/1922.shtml (last visited Dec. 3, 2012). 
104 World Series Winners, ESPN.COM, http://espn.go.com/mlb/worldseries/history
/winners (last visited Dec 3, 2012). 
105 Peter Bendix, The History of the American and National League, Part I, 
BEYONDTHEBOXSCORE.COM (Nov. 18, 2008), http://www.beyondtheboxscore
.com/2008/11/18/664028/the-history-of-the-america (noting that the World 
Series was the championship crowned after the National and American Leagues 
merged). 
106 With Holmes oldest (1841) and McReynolds and Sutherland youngest (1862). 
107 Fed. Baseball Club of Balt. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 
200, 207 (1922). 
108 LYLE SPATZ & STEVE STEINBERG, Preface to 1921: THE YANKEES, THE GIANTS, 
THE BATTLE FOR BASEBALL SUPREMACY IN NEW YORK xv (2010). 
109 See Standard Oil of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 79 (1911) (“So far as the 
decree held that the ownership of the stock of the New Jersey corporation 
constituted a combination in violation of the 1st section and an attempt to create 
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their beloved pastime, realizing that the risks in applying antitrust law 
against the sport were too great. It is no stretch of the imagination that 
baseball in 1922 held a similar place in the hearts of Americans as the 
American flag.110 
Toolson in 1953 only buttressed this stance by the Court. As noted, 
American football was still fourteen years from the first Super Bowl, 
and there had been thirty years of baseball as the exclusive sports 
outlet for Americans. After two World Wars, and at the tail end of the 
Korean War, the Court was again asked to determine whether baseball 
players could bring an antitrust suit against the MLB, potentially 
changing how the League operated. 
The Toolson opinion contained fewer than 200 words, and the 
Court refused to consider the facts of the case.111 Instead, the Court 
relied on shaky interpretive methods and punted the matter to the 
legislature.112 Instead of viewing the facts or hearing the claims, the 
Court may have understood the societal ramifications of taking away 
the blue-collar summer escape. Even in the dissent, Justice Burton 
recognized the “major asset which baseball is to our Nation, the high 
place it enjoys in the hearts of our people and the possible justification 
of special treatment for organized sports which are engaged in 
interstate trade or commerce.”113 Baseball was still the great equalizer, 
and it could help jurists in Washington, D.C., or coal workers in 
central Pennsylvania relate to one another through discussion of their 
favorite teams, their pastime. Baseball was a uniting factor, and with 
over sixty years of near exclusive control over the sports pages, the 
Court would have been faced with unparalleled criticism had it 
destroyed America’s beloved game. 
Just as Toolson was decided shortly after the Korean War in 1953, 
certiorari was granted in Flood during Vietnam in 1972.114 However, 
the rise in popularity of other sports such as football seemed to 
influence the Court’s decision in Flood. Flood was a challenge on the 
                                                                                                                   
a monopoly or to monopolize under the 2d section, and commanded the 
dissolution of the combination, the decree was clearly appropriate.”). 
110 See Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 (1907) (upholding laws prohibiting flag 
desecration). 
111 See Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953). 
112 See infra Part V.B. 
113 Toolson, 346 U.S. at 364 (Burton, J., dissenting). 
114 Flood v. Kuhn, 404 U.S. 880 (1971) (granting cert.). 
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reserve clause in the standard player contract in professional baseball, 
just like Federal Baseball and Toolson.115 Interestingly, as the rise in 
other sports’ popularity increased, the holding in Flood narrowed the 
exemption that baseball enjoyed.116 In fact, in the opinion, the Court 
quickly outlines other sports that did not share the exemption, 
something that it did not do in Federal Baseball or Toolson.117 Flood 
seemed to be indicative of baseball losing its grip on its antitrust 
exemption. 
Today, baseball, and specifically the MLB, does not conjure up 
notions of Americanism the hearts of fans as it once did. Starting with 
the MLB lockout of 1994 to 1995,118 Major League Baseball has 
entered a downward spiral that it cannot seem to escape.119 The 
homerun sluggers Barry Bonds,120 Mark McGwire,121 and Sammy 
Sosa122 of the late 1990s and early 2000s are just now getting their 
cases involving steroid use and subsequent perjury before grand juries 
and Congress.123 Roger Clemens even faced trial for perjury charges 
for steroid use; he later was acquitted.124 In any other sport, if these 
                                                 
115 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972). 
116 Id. at 289; see also sources cited supra notes 96–98. 
117 Id. at 276–81. 
118 See April Weiner, NFL and the CBA: Ranking the Worst Work Stoppages in Pro 
Sports History, The Bleacher Report (Mar. 10, 2011), available at http:
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/players/b/bondsba01.shtml (last visited Dec. 3, 2012). 
121 Mark McGwire, BASEBALL-REFERENCE.COM, http://www.baseball-reference
.com/players/m/mcgwima01.shtml (last visited Dec. 3, 2012). 
122 Sammy Sosa, BASEBALL-REFERENCE.COM, http://www.baseball-reference.com
/players/s/sosasa01.shtml (last visited Dec. 3, 2012). 
123 Paul Elias, Feds Urge Appeals Court to Uphold Bonds Conviction, 
THEBIGSTORY.AP.ORG (Jul. 19, 2012, 7:00 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article
/feds-urge-appeals-court-uphold-bonds-conviction. 
124 Pete Kasperowicz, House Agrees to Aid Prosecutors in Roger Clemens Trial, 
THE HILL (Feb. 17, 2012, 1:42 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/house
/211433; Russell Berman, Jury Acquits Roger Clemens on Charges of Lying to 
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sure-fire hall-of-fame caliber players were facing these types of 
charges and allegations, it would be national, front-page news. 
However, between the Mitchell Report,125 President George W. Bush’s 
statements during his 2004 State of the Union,126 and Congress 
proposing and enacting six different bills regarding mandatory 
minimum drug testing in professional sports,127 America has become 
numb to the bad acts of baseball players. 
Take for instance that in 2012 the reigning National League MVP 
Ryan Braun had prevailed in an appeal of his fifty-game suspension 
after having tested positive for performance enhancing drugs; it was 
the first time such an appeal had been successful.128 What makes the 
situation worse is that Braun could not prove that the test was faulty; 
he could only show that the specimen collector did not follow the 
established depositing procedures, but did follow generally accepted 
                                                                                                                   
Congress, THE HILL (June 18, 2012 4:04 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-
briefing-room/news/233315. 
125 See, e.g., Robert D. Manfred, Jr., Federal Labor Law Obstacles to Achieving a 
Completely Independent Drug Program in Major League Baseball, 19 MARQ. 
SPORTS L. REV. 1 (2008–2009) (summarizing the Mitchell Report, an 
independent investigation into the illegal use of performance enhancing drugs in 
the MLB). 
126 See President Bush Hopeful MLB Can Turn Page on Steroids Era, ESPN (Dec. 
15, 2007, 4:20 AM), http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=3154659. 
127 Manfred, Jr., supra note 125 at 1 n.2 (citing Brent D. Showalter, Comment, 
Steroid Testing Policies in Professional Sports: Regulated by Congress or the 
Responsibility of the Leagues?, 17 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 651, 653 n. 13, 660–
63 (2007) (summarizing the following bills: Drug Free Sports Act, H.R. 3084, 
109th Cong. (2005); Clean Sports Act of 2005, H.R. 2565, 109th Cong. 
(superseded by H.R. 1862); Prof’l Sports Integrity Act of 2005, H.R. 2516, 
109th Cong.; Clean Sports Act of 2005, S. 1114, 109th Cong. (companion bill to 
H.R. 2565); the Integrity in Prof’l Sports Act, S. 1960, 109th Cong. (2005); and 
the Prof’l Sports Responsibility and Accountability Act, S. 1334, 109th Cong. 
(2005))). 
128 Hobson Lopes, Ryan Braun Wins Appeal of Suspension: Still Guilty to the Fans, 
YAHOO! (Feb. 29, 2012, 7:56 AM), http://sports.yahoo.com/top/news?slug=ycn-
10930734. 
2013 Grounding Into a Double Standard 323 
practices.129 Braun’s critics say that he got off on a technicality and 
that justice was not done.130 
Disappointingly, Ryan Braun, Barry Bonds, etc., are not the only 
MLB players, past or present, that have had allegations mounted 
against them. Other current players have admitted to hardcore drug use 
such as crack cocaine,131 managers have gotten DUIs,132 and players 
from foreign countries have been accused of using false identities and 
deported.133 These black marks on the sport have taken their toll on the 
reputation of MLB. 
The perception that baseball is America’s pastime grounded the 
Court’s decision to grant an antitrust exemption to baseball in Federal 
Baseball. The idea that crossing state borders to exhibit games that 
fans pay money to see is somehow not interstate commerce clearly 
shows that something else was at play. It is hard to imagine that Justice 
Brandeis or then Chief Justice-turned-President Taft would not hold 
baseball to be interstate commerce today, as baseball is no longer the 
definitive American pastime. If the same standard were applied to 
professional sports today, with the NFL being the clear favorite, the 
NFL would be the most appropriate organization to receive immunity 
from antitrust. However, the 1957 Court in Radovich v. NFL134 
explicitly held that the NFL does not have any broad immunity like 
                                                 
129 Collector Says He Acted as Instructed, ESPN, (Feb. 29, 2012, 11:14 AM), http:
//espn.go.com/mlb/story/_/id/7625905/milwaukee-brewers-ryan-braun-case-
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130 See, e.g., The Herd with Colin Cowherd, ESPN RADIO (Feb. 29, 2012) 
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131 Ben Brown, Josh Hamilton: Rescued by Faith, BLEACHER REPORT (Feb. 28, 
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132 Cardinals Manager Arrested for DUI in Florida, ESPN (Mar. 22, 2007, 7:36 
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baseball and has continued to refuse to apply any similar immunity to 
the NFL since the ruling in Radovich.135 
It is a different time. The fifty-year-old of today was born in 1962. 
Today’s average man was raised during the NFL boom, it is unlikely 
that baseball is his pastime. All of the recent polls indicate that football 
is the predominant favorite American sport.136 Describing baseball as 
“America’s” pastime is thus idiomatic at best. In viewing the social 
preferences of today versus those at the time of Federal Baseball, 
Toolson and Flood, it is clear that the melding of baseball with notions 
of patriotism and American nationalism is no longer valid. 
B. Faulty Interpretive Methodologies in Toolson and Flood 
The interpretive methods used by the Toolson and Flood courts 
were fallacious. This section will explain the Supreme Court’s reliance 
on congressional silence or inaction to rule in favor of the MLB in 
Toolson. By analyzing this reliance, it will be shown that the 
interpretive methods relied on were faulty. Then the distinction 
between reason and result stare decisis will be identified and discussed 
to show that both Toolson and Flood misapplied the doctrine of stare 
decisis. Finally, it will be shown that when Congress looked to these 
faulty decisions to pass the Curt Flood Act, it codified the faults into 
law. 
1. Congressional Silence Prior to Toolson 
In the Toolson decision, the Supreme Court listed four reasons why 
it upheld Federal Baseball.137 The first of these factors was that 
“Congress has had the ruling under consideration but has not seen fit 
to bring [the baseball] business under [antitrust] laws by legislation 
having prospective effect.”138 In other words, the Court took the fact 
that Congress had not acted as evidence that Congress agreed with the 
Court’s decision. While there are some positive benefits of giving 
                                                 
135 See e.g., Am. Needle v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010) (holding 
that NFL’s grant to Reebok International of an exclusive license to market NFL 
team clothing “constitute[s] concerted action that is not categorically beyond the 
coverage of § 1 [of the Sherman Antitrust Act.”). 
136 Carroll, supra note 96. 
137 Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953). 
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weight to legislative inaction,139 congressional inaction in Toolson 
should not have been considered a controlling factor in the case. 
First, in Justice Burton’s dissent in Toolson, with whom Justice 
Reed concurred, Justice Burton pointed to a 1952 subcommittee report 
on the Study of Monopoly Power which said, in relevant part, that 
baseball was clearly involved with interstate commerce.140 This report 
was an indication to the Supreme Court that the year before the 
Toolson case was decided, Congress had serious doubts about the 
exemption that the Court granted in Federal Baseball.141 
Also, the Justices in Toolson didn’t recognize one of their fellow 
Justices’ view on legislative silence; in Justice Burton’s view: 
[A]lthough recognizing that by silence Congress at times may be 
taken to acquiesce and thus approve, we should be very sure that, 
under all the circumstances of a given situation, it has done so 
before we so rule and thus at once relieve ourselves from and shift 
to it the burden of correcting what we have done wrongly. . . . Just 
as dubious legislative history is at times much overridden, so also 
is silence or inaction often mistaken for legislation.142 
Thus, the Court was aware in 1946 of the dangers of relying on 
legislative silence. Though the debate over the reliance on legislative 
silence continues,143 the overwhelmingly dominant current theme is 
that Legislative silence is one of the least reliable methods of 
interpretation.144 Applying the heavy reliance on legislative silence in 
                                                 
139 See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 31–32 
(1982); see also Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 22–24 (1946) 
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such an important case today—with facts that clearly indicate that the 
group is engaged in interstate commerce—would be absurd. 
2. Stare Decisis Principles 
Aside from legislative silence, the Court in Flood applied the 
principles of stare decisis and in doing so, the Court reaffirmed more 
than fifty years of case law. 145 However, as noted in Part IV, supra, 
Piazza v. MLB critically analyzed the Court’s decision in Flood and its 
improper reliance on stare decisis.146 Again, MLB was sued for 
violating antitrust laws unrelated to the reserve clause.147 
In addressing MLB’s contention that it was exempt from antitrust 
lawsuits, the Piazza Court echoed the Flood Court’s holding that MLB 
was engaged in interstate commerce, essentially cancelling out 
Federal Baseball and Toolson.148 Quoting Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Piazza Court identified the 
principle of stare decisis—an interpretive principle heavily relied upon 
in Toolson and Flood—as having two major aspects.149 
The Piazza court stated that when examining a case “the Court 
provides the legal standard or test that is applicable to laws implicating 
a particular . . . provision.”150 Deference to another court’s choice of 
rule is known as rule stare decisis,151 and it was the aspect of stare 
decisis applied to the case at hand. After a court decides upon which 
rule to apply, they apply it and reach their result. Deference to another 
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court’s result is known as result stare decisis.152 This dichotomy seems 
straightforward enough. According to the Piazza court the Supreme 
Court in Flood did not apply rule stare decisis in upholding the 
exemption.153 Instead, the Court applied result stare decisis and 
effectively “invalidate[d] the rule of Federal Baseball and 
Toolson.”154 The Piazza court concluded that the Supreme Court’s 
invalidation of the reasoning in Flood meant that stare decisis should 
not decide the case before it.155 
Combining this ruling with the theories that discredit the use of 
legislative inaction, the Piazza court suggested that Flood was wrong 
in holding that there should be a continued exemption to the “business 
of baseball.”156 It also bolsters the proposition that Congress relied 
wrongly on the Flood decision in enacting the exemption into law; a 
proposition that reinforces the need to repeal the exemption. 
C. Current Analogous, Contradictory Case Law 
Finally, looking back to Piazza v. MLB, the court held that only the 
reserve system was exempt and that the “business of baseball” was 
well within the purview of antitrust law.157 Other case law since the 
passage of the Curt Flood Act has held that other professional sports 
entities are subject to the Sherman Act.158 
First, and most importantly, the 1957 case of Radovich v. NFL 
refused to allow the NFL an exemption similar to MLB.159 Most 
recently, in American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League,160 the 
Supreme Court unanimously held that the NFL, America’s most 
popular sports league,161 and the National Football League Players 
Association (NFLPA) are subject to antitrust law and do not act as a 
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153 Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 438. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 440. 
158 Id. at 435 (listing various professional sports that have been subjected to the 
Sherman Act). 
159 Radovich v. Nat’l Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957). 
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single entity.162 Other case law has established that the National 
Hockey League (NHL) cannot shield itself with a single entity 
defense.163 The Courts’ holdings in these cases showed judicial 
unwillingness to grant an exemption from antitrust lawsuits to any 
other major sports league.164 These cases support the assertion that if 
the issue were one of first impression today, the Court would not 
create an exemption for baseball. And while the Court may disapprove 
of its earlier decision, its mistaken rule of law is now codified and may 
only be corrected legislatively. 
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
This section will take the analysis of Section V and propose a new 
approach to Major League Baseball’s exemption to antitrust law under 
the Curt Flood Act. After combining all of the fallacies that led to the 
codified exemption, this section will conclude that MLB no longer 
deserves an exemption. 
As Section V discusses, flawed reasoning and social influences led 
Congress to the unfortunate passage of the Curt Flood Act. By straying 
from the fundamental basis of antitrust law, which places great 
emphasis on consumer protection, the Act places arbitrary emphasis on 
the game of Baseball. Combining MLB’s apparent inability to regulate 
itself, the game’s loss of credibility in the national spotlight, and the 
loss of admiration among Americans, it is time to repeal the Curt 
Flood Act. The Supreme Court holdings in Federal Baseball, Toolson, 
and Flood were flawed and legally unsound due to reliance on dubious 
interpretive methods and heavy social influence. Furthermore, the 
Act’s purpose—protecting a game with an inflated sense of its own 
relevance to modern society—is illegitimate. Baseball is an important 
sport in America, but it is not the most important sport. In relying on 
these cases to formulate the Curt Flood Act, Congress ignored the 
contradictory case law and to this day continues to allow an outdated, 
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poorly based exemption to stand. It is time to recognize these mistakes 
and correct the course by repealing MLB’s broad antitrust exemption. 
Making MLB subject to the same standards as other leagues would 
not impose any kind of an undue burden on MLB. The repeal of the 
Act would put MLB under the same rules as any other professional 
sports league, and football seems to be doing just fine. In addition, 
repeal would foster greater competition between the clubs, it would 
enhance the open markets in which baseball deals, and would force the 
owners to seek out more competitive deals with players, owners, 
teams, networks, and everyone else involved in the production of 
baseball. This competition would help cut costs. By enhancing the 
clubs’ freedom to open-bid their contracts—similar to the NFL’s 
practices—costs of certain things such as hats and bats will decrease 
because the contract would go to the most competitive bidder. The 
lower the expenditures, the higher the potential for profit, and the 
money saved by the clubs could go to be more competitive. For 
example, money saved could be spent to acquire free agents or to 
retain current players, thus preventing the loss of good players to other 
teams.165 In addition, being more competitive as a team would increase 
attendance and viewership, and being more competitive as a business 
would increase revenue. Increased revenue and greater attendance 
would further enhance the competition between the teams. All of these 
measures would ensure that the consumer is getting the best product 
available, fulfilling the purpose of antitrust law. 
However, repeal of the Curt Flood Act would not mean that every 
action that Major League Baseball makes would be subject to antitrust 
law. By repealing the Act, Congress would leave the current legal 
landscape to its own devices. The courts take a case-by-case approach 
to antitrust claims, and MLB may fend off claims just as well as other 
antitrust defendants have prevailed. The difference is that the 
defendants will win or lose on the merits of the case, and the outcomes 
will conform to the goals of antitrust law. The result of repealing the 
Act would be to allow the courts to determine what type of actions are 
unreasonable restraints on trade made between colluding economic 
rivals, instead of having their hands tied by an antiquated and 
illegitimate federal statute. 
                                                 
165 See, e.g., Tyler Kepner, Pujols Leaves Behind Fractured Legacy in St. Louis, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2011, at B12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011
/12/09/sports/baseball/in-st-louis-pujols-leaves-behind-a-statue-and-a-fractured-
legacy.html. 
